By Scott E. Schuster, Esq.

I read this article in the Pittsburgh Tribune Review:(http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/s_672744.html) and it got me thinking about state oversight of financially distressed municipalities. Under Pennsylvania state law (commonly referred to as Act 47), municipalities in the Commonwealth are not eligible to file for federal bankruptcy protection without first implementing a financial recovery plan overseen by a state appointed board.

This approach to municipal reorganization stands in stark contrast to the federal bankruptcy code. Under the state law, a distressed municipality attempts to cut expenses and increase revenue in an effort to pay off its debts. The result is often a myriad of political “quick-fixes,” such as new taxes, elimination of social programs, and the sale or lease of municipal assets, such as parking garages.

The state system lacks two significant components that the bankruptcy code provides to distressed companies or municipalities to assist in reorganization. First, Act 47 does not allow for the discharge of debts. Instead, Act 47 requires that the municipality attempt to restructure certain debts or pay them off with a lump sum. Of course, financially distressed municipalities usually lack the cash flow to make lump sum payments on large debts. Similarly, Act 47 does not allow municipalities to cancel unfavorable contracts. The inability to discharge debts and cancel unprofitable contracts would have proven fatal to several big companies that have emerged from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy over the past two decades; GM, US Airways, and the Pittsburgh Penguins, just to name a few.

Second, the Bankruptcy Code gives corporate debtors the ability to “cram down” union contracts for the best interest of all creditors. In other words, the Bankruptcy Code allows union contracts to be reasonably restructured so that the company’s employees do not sap all of the company’s future revenue, leaving nothing for creditors. Act 47 system has no such provision and, in fact, relies exclusively on the political leaders of the municipality - often unions’ closest allies - to enact changes in applicable collective bargaining agreements. Such a system is destined to fail and has done so, repeatedly.

The Tribune Review reports that 25 municipalities have entered Act 47 oversight but only 6 have escaped. Proof of Act 47’s shortcomings can be seen right here in Pittsburgh, which was forced into this state form of receivership in 2004 and has spent nearly 6 years attempting to right its financial ship, but to no avail. As of this writing, Pittsburgh’s employee pensions have only 30% of the money necessary to fund future payouts. Unions have refused to agree to reduce their benefits and the politicians responsible for forcing such concessions lack the political backbone to press for change. In short, politics has taken over and, 6 years later, the City is still on the verge of bankruptcy. How has Act 47 helped the City of Pittsburgh? It hasn’t.

With the economic downturn and lack of revenue, more and more municipalities in Pennsylvania are at risk of falling into Act 47 protection. Those municipalities are staring at five to ten years of financial purgatory, during which no meaningful changes take place and bankruptcy continues to loom on the horizon. I say let Pennsylvania municipalities file bankruptcy.

by Shawn P. McClure, Esq.

In a perfect world, a creditor would never have to file a lawsuit to collect on balances due and owing from debtors.  In a great world, any judgment obtained as a result of a lawsuit would immediately be paid by the judgment debtor.  In reality, creditors are often forced to sit on a judgment and hope that their judgment debtor either comes into some money or tries to sell a piece of real estate encumbered by their judgment lien.  This can take years. 

    Does this judgment simply sit interest free?  If not, then what interest rate is applicable to the judgment?  The answer to the first question is easy.  Under Pennsylvania law, at a minimum, interest will acrue on the judgment at the rate of six percent per annum.  As a creditor you have the ability to determine whether that rate is higher or lower when contracting with your future debtor at the beginning of your relationship.  

    Pennsylvania law provides that a plaintiff is entitled to interest on a judgment for a specific sum of money from the date of the verdict.  42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8101, (“Except as otherwise provided by another statute, a judgment for a specific sum of money shall bear interest at the lawful rate from the date of the verdict or award, or from the date of the judgment, if the judgment is not entered upon a verdict or award.”).  “Thus the general rule is that a plaintiff is entitled to interest on a judgment from the date of the verdict, and for purposes of computing interest, judgment and verdict are synonymous.” Osial v. Cook, 2002 PA Super 214, 803 A.2d 209, 215 (Pa. Super. 1994).

    A plaintiff receives statutory post-judgment interest as a matter of right where the damages are ascertainable by computation. Pittsburgh Constr. Co. v. Griffith, 2003 PA Super 374 (Pa. Super. 2003).

    Currently, the statutory rate of interest in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is fixed at six percent (6%) per annum, “but parties to a contract may agree to a higher rate.” Id; See, 41 P.S. § 202; In re Estate of Braun, 437 Pa. Super. 372, 650 A.2d 73, 78 (Pa. Super. 1994) (“the courts of this Commonwealth have found that the parties may agree to a post-judgment interest rate in excess of that provided by statute”); see, e.g., Miller v. City of Reading, 369 Pa. $71, 473-474, 87 A.2d 223, 226 (1952) (party who illegally fails to pay a debt is liable to pay interest thereon at the statutory rate unless the parties expressly agree otherwise); Smith v. Mitchell, 420 Pa. Super. at 144, 616 A.2d at 21 (Pa. Super. 1992) (quoting Daset Mining Corp. v. Industrial Fuels Corp., 326 Pa. Super. 14, 36, 473 A.2d 584, 595 (1984) and recognizing that in contracts concerning the payment of the sum of money at a rate higher or lower than the legal rate, they can agree to have the agreed upon interest rate continue after the debt becomes due; in the absence of an agreement, the interest rate fixed by law attaches); Cumberland Valley Cooperative Association v. Martin, 11 D.& C. 4^th 10, 12 (C.C.P. Cumberland County 1991) (specific intent of the parties prevails over the statutory rate; parties’ agreement to pay post-judgment interest rate of 15% was upheld).

    Therefore, if the parties’ agreement is silent as to interest or refers to “legal” or “lawful” interest, the judgment creditor is limited to six percent (6%) per annum in post-judgment interest.  However, where the parties’ agreement expressly provides for a higher interest rate and the plaintiff has plead this higher rate, Pennsylvania law allows for the imposition of post-judgment interest at the higher, agreed upon rate.  Once again, another example of why it is better to plan for the worst and hope for the best when entering into a creditor/debtor relationship.   

by Scott E. Schuster, Esq.