by Shawn P. McClure, Esq.

Often, when foreclosing on a piece of real property, a secured creditor’s focus and objective is limited to the recovery of the property. However, in this economic climate, more and more secured creditors are electing to pursue a deficiency balance against the debtor because the underlying debt owed exceeds the value of any real property that is recovered.

Deficiency Judgments in Pennsylvania are governed by statute. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8103. In order to establish a deficiency balance, a judgment creditor must first file a Petition to Fix the Fair Market Value of Real Property Sold. This Petition must be filed within six (6) months, “following execution and delivery of the sheriff’s deed for the property sold in connection with the execution proceedings.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5522(b)(2). Therefore, it is important that a creditor make the decision to pursue a deficiency balance as soon as possible.

The purpose of the petition is to establish a fair market value of the real property sold, so that figure can be offset against the total amount of the debt owed. This process recognizes that the secured creditor who purchases the real property at foreclosure sale for Sheriff’s costs, usually a couple thousand dollars, cannot then pursue the debtor for the full remaining balance of the debt. Establishing the fair market value and crediting it against the debt owed prevents the secured creditor from receiving a windfall.

The Petition is filed as a supplementary proceeding on the same docket in which the judgment was entered. If an answer is filed to the Petition alleging that the fair market value of the property is more than the value stated in the petition, then the court shall hear evidence and fix the fair market value of the property sold. This is usually a battle of appraisals that turns on what parties’ appraiser appears more qualified and credible to the court.

While the deficiency judgment process in Pennsylvania seems quite simple, there are two important factors that cannot be overlooked: 1) Timing; and 2) Hiring a qualified appraiser. These are both issues that can easily be address by your creditors’ rights attorney.

by Shawn P. McClure, Esq.

While I subscribe to the belief that a secured lien holder should always know the location of its collateral, I understand that is essentially impossible to practice. Which is why a secured lien holder may some day find themselves in a position where they find their collateral in the possession of a third party. Often that third party is a garage looking to be paid for repairs, towing or storage with respect to the collateral.

Under Pennsylvania law, the secured lien holder is generally on the hook for repairs and towing charges. The theory being that the secured lien holder receives any benefit bestowed upon the collateral. However, a dispute often arises over storage fees. Particularly, where a garage stores the collateral and then makes no effort to inform the secured lien holder of the collateral’s location.

With typical charges of $25.00-$35.00 per day, these storage fees can quickly accumulate. A garage is entitled to any storage fees incurred after the secured lien holder gave “consent” to storing the collateral. Obviously, if the secured lien holder gave express consent to store the collateral, there is no issue. The problem arises in instances of implied consent. Implied consent will be found when the garage has sent notice to the secured lien holder that they have the collateral and the secured lien holder does not pick up the collateral.

However, most problems arise when express consent is not given and notice is not sent. The secured lien holder after months of contacting the Debtor about delinquent payments finally hears from the Debtor that the collateral has been at the local garage for months. So what does a secured lien holder do?

1. Immediately contact the garage and find out exactly what amount of money they are demanding. Obtain a break down of the charges identifying what is for repairs, towing, storage, etc. Also, find out what they are charging per day to store the collateral.

2. Immediately make a reasonable offer, in writing, to the garage to resolve the matter. Pennsylvania case law provides that if a garage declines a reasonable offer to a secured lien holder, then the garage cannot seek any storage fees if it is later found consent to storage did not exist.

3. It is usually best to settle. However, if the garage is unreasonable, then immediate legal action should be taken by contacting your creditors’ rights attorney.

By Jennifer Tis, Esq.

Undoubtedly, social networking sites such as Facebook will change the face of the legal practice in a number of ways, some foreseeable, some not. Already, Facebook has been used in criminal investigations, used for “cyber-bullying” and has been the subject of privacy disputes due to school administrations’ use of Facebook to suspend students for activities such as underage drinking.
Facebook has also been a sought-after source of information for attorneys involved in active litigation in a variety of areas of the law. Whether it’s a civil or criminal matter, a case can often be expeditiously closed due to a few posts made by either the Plaintiff or Defendant on Facebook or other social networking site. Often times, however, an individual’s public posts may not reveal much in regards to an active litigation matter though the individual’s private posts and messages may disclose much more. The question is, how can an attorney ethically gain access to the private information located within an opposing party’s social network site?
It is tempting to have another individual, such as a friend, secretary or paralegal, send a “friend request” to an opposing party in order to gain access to the information that is not made public on their Facebook page. To do so, however, would violate a number of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, including, but not limited to, Rule 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants) and 8.4 (Misconduct).
Rather, there are a few non-binding cases out there that suggest that private information from an individual’s social network site may be obtained through discovery requests. One case in particular comes from Jefferson County, Pennsylvania and illustrates what may be Pennsylvania’s emerging view toward discovery and social networking sites. In McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, the Plaintiff claimed that he was injured when the Defendant rear-ended him during a cool down lap after a stock race.
After the Plaintiff posted information on the public portion of his Facebook and MySpace accounts which indicated that he may not actually be injured, the Defendant requested Plaintiff’s usernames and passwords to his social network accounts in Interrogatories. The Plaintiff objected to this request and the Defendant filed a Motion to Compel. The Court granted Defendant’s Motion and ordered the Plaintiff to produce his usernames and passwords to his Facebook and MySpace accounts to Defendant’s counsel, only (the Defendant, himself, was not permitted access to the accounts). The Court further ordered that the Plaintiff was prohibited from taking steps to alter or delete existing information or posts from his Facebook and MySpace accounts.
The Court stated: “Under Pennsylvania’s broad discovery rules, as long as it is relevant to the litigation, whether directly or peripherally, a party may obtain discovery regarding any unprivileged matter. Pa.R.C.P. 4003.1.” McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, 2010 Pa.Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270, 2. “In this case, the Plaintiff asked the Court to recognize communications shared among his private friends on social network computer sites as confidential and privileged and thus protected against disclosure.” Id, at 3.The Court noted that Pennsylvania law does not favor evidentiary privileges “for they are in derogation of the search for the truth.” Id, (quoting) Hutchison v. Luddy, 414 Pa. Super. 138, 606 A.2d 905, 908-09 (Pa. Super. 1992) (quoting) Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175, 99 S. Ct. 1635, 60 L. Ed. 2d 115 (1979).
The Court also pointed to the terms and privacy policies of both Facebook and MySpace stating that they “clearly express the possibility of disclosure” barring the Plaintiff from successfully maintaining that the element of confidentiality protects his Facebook and MySpace accounts from discovery. Id at 10.
The Court went on to state “whatever relational harm may be realized by social network computer site users is undoubtedly outweighed by the benefit of correctly disposing of litigation.” Id, at 11.
The fact that the Plaintiff first posted public information that was relevant to the matter and, therefore, suggested that additional relevant information may be located in the private sections of his Facebook and MySpace pages was clearly taken into account. Had he not made the public posts, I believe that the Court may have ruled differently.
Although this case is not binding, it may be an indication of what is to come from Pennsylvania Courts with respect to social networking sites and litigation. Will Pennsylvania adopt a narrow interpretation of confidentiality? Only time and additional ill-advised posts from plaintiffs and defendants will tell.

by Jennifer L. Tis, Esq.

As a creditor’s rights attorney, I often receive Answers to our Complaints filed Pro Se by  Defendants. Sometimes these Answers are in the proper format and I assume that an attorney prepared the response but declined to enter his appearance. Sometimes, however, they simply consist of a paragraph denying liability for the debt or expressing an interest in entering into a payment plan. Whether or not they are in the proper format is irrelevant, however, if the Defendant is a corporation. Thanks to the Pennsylvania case of Walacavage v. Excell 2000, Inc., 331 Pa.Super. 137, 480 A.2d 281 (Pa.Super., 1984) a corporate entity may only appear in court through an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. This means that if an individual who owns a corporation files a Pro Se response to a Complaint that names only the corporation as the defendant he is in violation of Pennsylvania law.

The Court in Walacavage also addressed the concern that the requirement of a corporate entity to hire counsel puts corporations at a disadvantage. The Court stated that such a requirement does not deny corporations due process or equal protection under the law. It seems that there are several rationales behind this requirement one of which is the fact that a corporation is technically fictitious so that even if the individual filing the Pro Se response is the President of the corporation, the corporation itself is a fabrication and, therefore, cannot represent itself. Another suggested rationale is that incorporating a business brings many benefits including protection from personal liability. By the same token, however, there are responsibilities that come with such protection including the responsibility to hire an attorney for representation. Finally, it is suggested that the legal issues before the court can become confused when an attorney is not representing a corporation, however, I don’t see how it can be any more confusing for the court than when an individual represents himself…it can be bewildering for everyone involved.  I, personally, believe that the rationale accounting for equal benefits and responsibilities makes the most sense. If an individual wants to remain shielded from personal liability he is going to have sacrifice some benefits that he would otherwise have if not incorporated such as the ability to represent himself in court. You can’t have your cake and represent it in court, too.

                It is always surprising to me how many individuals who have incorporated a business are unaware of the necessity of retaining counsel for a legal matter. In my opinion, the best way to go about dealing with a Pro Se response from a corporate defendant is to file Preliminary Objections to the response. Filing Preliminary Objections to a Pro Se response from a corporate Defendant can save a great deal of time for you and a great deal of money for your client. I find that it often leads to settlement or, better yet, has the effect of getting the response stricken followed by Judgment by Default. From both a financial and expeditious perspective either of these two scenarios is preferable to having to prepare for and attend arbitration or trial as well as requiring your client to send a witness to court.

by Scott Schuster, Esq.

Many of you are familiar with preferences actions and the defenses to those actions. You may not be aware of fraudulent transfer actions. With the increasing rise in bankruptcy cases in which the main secured creditor is “under water,” bankrupt debtors and trustees are using preference actions as a primary means for collecting funds to distribute to unsecured creditors. However, since unsecured creditors are increasingly aware of preference defenses and how to properly deal with questionable debtors, preference actions are becoming less profitable for the bankruptcy estate. As a result, we’re seeing an increase in the use of fraudulent transfer actions to recover funds for the estate.

There are two types of fraudulent transfer actions: actual fraud (the Debtor deliberately defrauds creditors) an constructive fraud (discussed below). Since actual fraud is somewhat rare, this article is focused on constructively fraudulent transfers.

A transfer is constructively fraudulent if: (1) the debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer and (2) the debtor was (a) insolvent on the date of the transfer or became insolvent as a result of the transfer, (b) the debtor was engaged or was about to engage in a business or transaction for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital, or (c) the debtor intended to incur or believed that it would incur debts beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as such debts matured.

Most of the cases relating to fraudulent transfers focus on the “reasonably equivalent value” language of the statute. Generally speaking, the courts look to (1) whether the value transferred by the Debtor is approximately equal to the value of what was received by the Debtor in exchange for the transfer and (2) whether the transaction took place at an arm’s length.

In a typical scenario, a vendor provides goods or services having a certain value and the Debtor makes payment sometime thereafter. In this situation, no fraudulent transfer has occurred because the Debtor received “reasonably equivalent value” for its payment.

However, imagine the following scenario: A construction company is composed of three affiliates. Company A cuts timber and delivers it to Company B. Company B processes the timber and makes plywood and delivers it to Company C. Company C uses the plywood to make kitchen cabinets. While these three companies share some common owners, they conduct business at arms-length, do not have any parent-subsidiary relationships and are, for all intents and purposes, separate and distinct legal entities.

Now imagine the creditor that provides $100,000 worth of monthly shipping services for Company A. This creditor is “bankruptcy savvy” and, therefore, insists on 30 day payment terms and strict adherence to payments made in the “ordinary course of business.” All three companies file for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. When the creditor receives notice of Company A’s bankruptcy, the creditor is secure in knowing that any potential preference action would top out at $300,000 (three months worth of payments) and knows that it has strong defenses to such an action.

Months later, the creditor receives a complaint from the Trustee in Company C’s Bankruptcy demanding the return of $2.4 million worth of “fraudulent transfers.” The complaint indicates that for many years all three companies were insolvent and had problems balancing cash flow. Due to these problems, Company C would pay some of Company A’s Accounts Payable. Pursuant to this arrangement, Company C paid all of the creditors invoices that were directed to Company A. The trustee claims that when Company C paid the monthly invoices for Company A, Company C received no value whatsoever, since the services were delivered to Company A. The trustee therefore demands the return of 2 years worth of monthly payments paid by Company C. Upon review of its file, the creditor is shocked to notice that the checks it received on its invoices were from Company C and not Company A.

Sounds ridiculous, right? Well, while there are certain fact intensive exceptions, such transactions are generally considered “fraudulent transfers” that are recoverable by a bankruptcy trustee.

A creditor that unknowingly receives such a fraudulent transfer is in a very unfortunate situation. While preferences only occur during the 90 days preceding the preference action, the bankruptcy code’s “look back” period for fraudulent transfers is 2 years (which can actually increase depending on which state’s laws apply). Consequently, creditors are at risk of much larger lawsuits being filed to recover fraudulent transfers than the typical preference actions, making it very hard to limit a creditors’ exposure.

More importantly, preference defenses – i.e. ordinary course of business, new value, contemporaneous exchange – do not apply to fraudulent transfers. The fraudulent transfer defenses – typically that the payor received reasonably equivalent value and/or that the payor was insolvent at the time it made the payment – are heavily fact intensive. In other words, the litigation is time consuming and expensive.

For legal and tax purposes, most large companies are split into multiple affiliates, meaning the risks posted by fraudulent transfer actions to unknowing creditors are quite large. For those “bankruptcy savvy” creditors that I mentioned, the best way to protect against such an action is to demand payment from the debtor to which you supplied services. While accepting payment from an affiliate is often the easiest way to get paid timely, it may ultimately end up costing you substantially down the road.

by Shawn P. McClure

Once a claim goes legal, there are many factors that come into play and directly impact a creditor’s ability to get paid.  As a credit professional, you must be aware of these factors to determine their impact on settlement negotiations and how far you decide to push the debtor.  As a creditors’ rights attorney, we must be available to quickly identify how these factors impact litigation and provide our clients with intelligent insight as to how litigation is likely to play out in light of these factors.

The rules of evidence are such a factor.  All of a sudden the forwarded email from a cousin’s mother’s friend who used to work for the debtor may not make it to the trier-of-fact, let alone have the impact the creditor thought it would.   

In the typical creditor-debtor dispute, evidence usually translates to written documents (contracts, invoices, statements, correspondence etc.) setting forth the basis for the parties’ relationship.  As a result of being a simple man, I like to keep in mind three simple concepts when determining whether I can get documents into evidence.  Those concepts are:

1.       Relevance – Why does this matter?

2.       Authentication – Is this real?

3.       Hearsay – Is this reliable?

The first concept is pretty self explanatory and is often easily understood because it involves logic that makes sense to a layperson.  For example, my client’s contract with the debtor is relevant to the issue of whether or not money is owed to my client.  Whereas, my client’s lease with their landlord has no bearing on the issue. 

It is with issues of authentication and hearsay, that clients and attorneys spend an inordinate amount of time explaining to each other and arguing with debtor’s counsel.  I could write pages upon pages trying to explain these concepts, so I will leave you with three helpful tips.  The last being the most useful.  Pay attention to rules on self-authenticating documents to hopefully ease the burden on yourself.  Hearsay is an out of court statement offered for its truth, it remains hearsay even if the declarant is now on the stand during trial.  Lastly, evidence law is determined by the trial judge that you are currently practicing before.  

I would like to wrap up by sharing a recent experience that illustrates why it is important to keep evidence concepts in mind throughout the legal process. 

I recently had a case where debtor’s counsel filed preliminary objections in response to my client’s complaint.  Simultaneously, debtor’s counsel served discovery requests.  More specifically, debtor’s counsel served a request for production of documents seeking the original credit application that was alleged in the complaint.  Debtor’s counsel filed preliminary objections asking the court to dismiss the complaint because we failed to attach the original credit application to our complaint.  The basis for these objections being that the failure to attach the original credit application was a violation of the Best Evidence Doctrine.  Well, we didn’t have the original credit application.  We told debtor’s counsel we didn’t have it in our responses to discovery.  However, in deciding the preliminary objections, the judge correctly overruled the debtor.  As simple as it sounds, debtor’s counsel forgot one importance aspect of the Best Evidence Doctrine.  It doesn’t come into play until a party is trying to put evidence into the record at trial.   

As for how that case turned out at trial … it will probably settle soon.     

by Scott Schuster, Esq.

It is now common to see individuals file 2, 3, even 4 personal bankruptcies. As the economy continues to stagnate, we are beginning to see multiple filers more often. Creditors should be on alert.

One of the primary reasons for the US bankruptcy system is to give debtors a “fresh start.” The theory is that a debtor weighed down by mountains of debt will have no rational motivation to work hard and contribute to society because any accumulated wealth will just be taken by his/her creditors. A bankruptcy discharge allows such a debtor the ability to avoid those debts and get on with his/her life. If such a discharge were not available, thousands of American citizens would have no reason to contribute to society and, therefore, become a burden to the rest of the country.

However, an individual debtor may file bankruptcy and receive a discharge of all of his/her debts once every seven years. In addition to being able to “burn” their creditors more than once, multiple filers pose even greater threats. Most first-time filers are unaware of how bankruptcy works (i.e. what can and cannot be discharged, how long the process takes, etc.). On the other hand, multiple filers know what debts can be readily discharged and are better able to “game” the system.

As a result, second (or third, or fourth . . .) time filers often prepare for bankruptcy years in advance by rebuilding their credit, obtaining credit and increasing their debts gradually, with no real intention to repay those debts. This is fraud, plain and simple. As a result, creditors should be on alert for second-time filers.

If you believe that one of your debtors has committee fraud, you should contact a bankruptcy attorney about the “nondischargeability” provisions in the bankruptcy code that may be available to you. The Bankruptcy Code sets forth an extensive list of debts that are nondischargeable. Unfortunately, nondischargeability is not automatic – a creditor that holds such a debt must file a complaint with the Bankruptcy Court seeking to have the debt declared nondischargeable. A nondischargeability complaint must usually be filed within about sixty (60) to ninety (90) days after the debtor files his or her bankruptcy petition. 

by,

Shawn P. McClure

You do.  Seems simple enough.  However, you would be surprised at the number of creditors that are under the mistaken belief that the debtor will be on the hook for any and all expenses associated with a creditor’s lawsuit to collect on a debt.

For example, your case is scheduled for trial.  The parties are not close to settlement.  The debtor has retained counsel and has fought you every step of the way.  They have offered a 50% settlement.  You are not taking a dime less than, “everything your owed and then some.”

You must appear as a witness for trial.  The debtor still will not meet your demands.  “Well, you tell that son of a b@tch that I’m flying first class; staying at the Four Seasons and charging him for my time out of the office.  It’s going to cost him a lot more if I come to court.”

It is at this point that I must kindly point out that the debtor will not be on the hook for any of the aforementioned expenses in this $3,000.00 collection action.

This is result of a general rule of law often referred to as the “American Rule.”  The American Rule provides that each party is general responsible for paying its own attorneys’ fees and expenses associated with litigation.  Like any rule, there are exceptions. The two most common exceptions to the American Rule are the existence of a statute or contract that provides for the imposition of attorneys’ fees and costs on another party.  However, as stated above, the general rule is that every party, event the winning party, must pay its own attorneys’ fees and costs.

The reasoning behind the American Rule is to prevent discouraging people from seeking redress for their perceived wrongs or from expanding legal jurisrudence.  The American Rule recognizes that any other rule would have a chilling effect on one’s decision to pursue a meritorious claim merely because they may have to pay the defendant’s expenses if unsuccessful.

In sum, just because you are suing someone don’t think that it isnt going to cost you.

by Scott Schuster, Esq.

According to a recent article in the New York Times, individual and corporate bankruptcies are at a five-year high. As a creditor, here are three things to keep in mind during these difficult financial times:

1)      With the increase in “under water” secured creditors, unsecured creditors are receiving less and less on their claims through bankruptcy. It may be a good idea to have a backup if a customer fails to pay its bills. Letters of credit, lien rights, and partial payments on delivery are all ways to mitigate the damage that can be caused by a failing customer’s bankruptcy.

2)      Just because a customer has always paid its bills in the past does not mean it will do so in the future. Increasingly, even healthy companies are struggling financially. Keep an  eye on credit terms that you extend to all of your customers, both big and small. It never hurts to reevaluate the terms on which you extend credit to your largest customers. If you conduct a credit worthiness analysis and find something troubling, it may cause you to take additional action to protect yourself from unpaid bills. If the credit check reveals no problems, at least you can sleep soundly knowing that those customers are healthy enough to pay their bills in the future.

3)      Preference actions are on the rise. Debtors and trustees are looking to preference actions as a means to fund distributions to unsecured creditors. This means creditors should be aware of the defenses to those actions and should review their “danger” clients to make sure that payment times are not getting too high. Ideally, payments should be made within (or very close to) payment terms (“NET 30,” etc.). If customers are not doing so, it may be prudent to limit the amount of credit that you extend now to protect yourself from a preference action in the future.

by Shawn P. McClure 

Under Pennsylvania common law, “the primary difference between a surety and a guarantor is the time at which a creditor can collect from each.  With regard to suretyship, the creditor can look to the surety for immediate payment upon the occurrence of a default by the principal obligor or debtor … However, where an individual is a guarantor, the creditor must first attempt to collect the debt from the principal debtor/obligor before demanding performance from the guarantor.”  Reuter v. Citizens & Northern Bank, 410 Pa.Super 199, 208, 599 A.2d 673, 678 (Pa. Super. 1991). 

Sounds troubling for a creditor.  After reading that statement, there is probably one question that quickly comes to mind.  What constitutes an “attempt?”  This question could be argued a hundred times over.  Thankfully, the Pennsylvania legislature has brought some clarity to this question. 

Under 13 Pa.C.S. § 1201, which is Pennsylvania’s codified version of the Uniform Commercial Code’s general definitional section, “[s]urety. Includes a guarantor or other secondary obligor.” 13 Pa.C.S. § 1201.  Thus, no “timing” requirement exists as to when a creditor can look to a guarantor for payment of a debt.      

Moreover, Pennsylvania statute provides that:                                                  

“[e]very written agreement hereafter made by one person to answer for the default of another shall subject such person to the liabilities of a suretyship, and shall confer upon him the rights incident thereto, unless such agreement shall contain in substance the words: “This is not intended to be a contract of suretyship,” or unless each portion of such agreement intended to modify the rights and liabilities of suretyship shall contain in substance the words: “This portion of the agreement is not intended to impose the liability of a suretyship.”

      8 P.S. § 1. See, also, Keystone Bank v. Flooring Specialists, Inc., 513 Pa. 103, 113, 518 A.2d 1179, 1184 (1986) (“section 1201 of the UCC is not the sole authority for treating a guarantor, especially where he has ‘guaranteed payment,’ as a surety.”).

      Accordingly, where Pennsylvania law applies, a creditor with adequately drafted documents does not have to first look to the principal debtor/obligor for payment before pursuing a guarantor.