by Scott Schuster, Esq.

Many of you are familiar with preferences actions and the defenses to those actions. You may not be aware of fraudulent transfer actions. With the increasing rise in bankruptcy cases in which the main secured creditor is “under water,” bankrupt debtors and trustees are using preference actions as a primary means for collecting funds to distribute to unsecured creditors. However, since unsecured creditors are increasingly aware of preference defenses and how to properly deal with questionable debtors, preference actions are becoming less profitable for the bankruptcy estate. As a result, we’re seeing an increase in the use of fraudulent transfer actions to recover funds for the estate.

There are two types of fraudulent transfer actions: actual fraud (the Debtor deliberately defrauds creditors) an constructive fraud (discussed below). Since actual fraud is somewhat rare, this article is focused on constructively fraudulent transfers.

A transfer is constructively fraudulent if: (1) the debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer and (2) the debtor was (a) insolvent on the date of the transfer or became insolvent as a result of the transfer, (b) the debtor was engaged or was about to engage in a business or transaction for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital, or (c) the debtor intended to incur or believed that it would incur debts beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as such debts matured.

Most of the cases relating to fraudulent transfers focus on the “reasonably equivalent value” language of the statute. Generally speaking, the courts look to (1) whether the value transferred by the Debtor is approximately equal to the value of what was received by the Debtor in exchange for the transfer and (2) whether the transaction took place at an arm’s length.

In a typical scenario, a vendor provides goods or services having a certain value and the Debtor makes payment sometime thereafter. In this situation, no fraudulent transfer has occurred because the Debtor received “reasonably equivalent value” for its payment.

However, imagine the following scenario: A construction company is composed of three affiliates. Company A cuts timber and delivers it to Company B. Company B processes the timber and makes plywood and delivers it to Company C. Company C uses the plywood to make kitchen cabinets. While these three companies share some common owners, they conduct business at arms-length, do not have any parent-subsidiary relationships and are, for all intents and purposes, separate and distinct legal entities.

Now imagine the creditor that provides $100,000 worth of monthly shipping services for Company A. This creditor is “bankruptcy savvy” and, therefore, insists on 30 day payment terms and strict adherence to payments made in the “ordinary course of business.” All three companies file for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. When the creditor receives notice of Company A’s bankruptcy, the creditor is secure in knowing that any potential preference action would top out at $300,000 (three months worth of payments) and knows that it has strong defenses to such an action.

Months later, the creditor receives a complaint from the Trustee in Company C’s Bankruptcy demanding the return of $2.4 million worth of “fraudulent transfers.” The complaint indicates that for many years all three companies were insolvent and had problems balancing cash flow. Due to these problems, Company C would pay some of Company A’s Accounts Payable. Pursuant to this arrangement, Company C paid all of the creditors invoices that were directed to Company A. The trustee claims that when Company C paid the monthly invoices for Company A, Company C received no value whatsoever, since the services were delivered to Company A. The trustee therefore demands the return of 2 years worth of monthly payments paid by Company C. Upon review of its file, the creditor is shocked to notice that the checks it received on its invoices were from Company C and not Company A.

Sounds ridiculous, right? Well, while there are certain fact intensive exceptions, such transactions are generally considered “fraudulent transfers” that are recoverable by a bankruptcy trustee.

A creditor that unknowingly receives such a fraudulent transfer is in a very unfortunate situation. While preferences only occur during the 90 days preceding the preference action, the bankruptcy code’s “look back” period for fraudulent transfers is 2 years (which can actually increase depending on which state’s laws apply). Consequently, creditors are at risk of much larger lawsuits being filed to recover fraudulent transfers than the typical preference actions, making it very hard to limit a creditors’ exposure.

More importantly, preference defenses – i.e. ordinary course of business, new value, contemporaneous exchange – do not apply to fraudulent transfers. The fraudulent transfer defenses – typically that the payor received reasonably equivalent value and/or that the payor was insolvent at the time it made the payment – are heavily fact intensive. In other words, the litigation is time consuming and expensive.

For legal and tax purposes, most large companies are split into multiple affiliates, meaning the risks posted by fraudulent transfer actions to unknowing creditors are quite large. For those “bankruptcy savvy” creditors that I mentioned, the best way to protect against such an action is to demand payment from the debtor to which you supplied services. While accepting payment from an affiliate is often the easiest way to get paid timely, it may ultimately end up costing you substantially down the road.

by Shawn P. McClure

Once a claim goes legal, there are many factors that come into play and directly impact a creditor’s ability to get paid.  As a credit professional, you must be aware of these factors to determine their impact on settlement negotiations and how far you decide to push the debtor.  As a creditors’ rights attorney, we must be available to quickly identify how these factors impact litigation and provide our clients with intelligent insight as to how litigation is likely to play out in light of these factors.

The rules of evidence are such a factor.  All of a sudden the forwarded email from a cousin’s mother’s friend who used to work for the debtor may not make it to the trier-of-fact, let alone have the impact the creditor thought it would.   

In the typical creditor-debtor dispute, evidence usually translates to written documents (contracts, invoices, statements, correspondence etc.) setting forth the basis for the parties’ relationship.  As a result of being a simple man, I like to keep in mind three simple concepts when determining whether I can get documents into evidence.  Those concepts are:

1.       Relevance – Why does this matter?

2.       Authentication – Is this real?

3.       Hearsay – Is this reliable?

The first concept is pretty self explanatory and is often easily understood because it involves logic that makes sense to a layperson.  For example, my client’s contract with the debtor is relevant to the issue of whether or not money is owed to my client.  Whereas, my client’s lease with their landlord has no bearing on the issue. 

It is with issues of authentication and hearsay, that clients and attorneys spend an inordinate amount of time explaining to each other and arguing with debtor’s counsel.  I could write pages upon pages trying to explain these concepts, so I will leave you with three helpful tips.  The last being the most useful.  Pay attention to rules on self-authenticating documents to hopefully ease the burden on yourself.  Hearsay is an out of court statement offered for its truth, it remains hearsay even if the declarant is now on the stand during trial.  Lastly, evidence law is determined by the trial judge that you are currently practicing before.  

I would like to wrap up by sharing a recent experience that illustrates why it is important to keep evidence concepts in mind throughout the legal process. 

I recently had a case where debtor’s counsel filed preliminary objections in response to my client’s complaint.  Simultaneously, debtor’s counsel served discovery requests.  More specifically, debtor’s counsel served a request for production of documents seeking the original credit application that was alleged in the complaint.  Debtor’s counsel filed preliminary objections asking the court to dismiss the complaint because we failed to attach the original credit application to our complaint.  The basis for these objections being that the failure to attach the original credit application was a violation of the Best Evidence Doctrine.  Well, we didn’t have the original credit application.  We told debtor’s counsel we didn’t have it in our responses to discovery.  However, in deciding the preliminary objections, the judge correctly overruled the debtor.  As simple as it sounds, debtor’s counsel forgot one importance aspect of the Best Evidence Doctrine.  It doesn’t come into play until a party is trying to put evidence into the record at trial.   

As for how that case turned out at trial … it will probably settle soon.     

by Scott Schuster, Esq.

It is now common to see individuals file 2, 3, even 4 personal bankruptcies. As the economy continues to stagnate, we are beginning to see multiple filers more often. Creditors should be on alert.

One of the primary reasons for the US bankruptcy system is to give debtors a “fresh start.” The theory is that a debtor weighed down by mountains of debt will have no rational motivation to work hard and contribute to society because any accumulated wealth will just be taken by his/her creditors. A bankruptcy discharge allows such a debtor the ability to avoid those debts and get on with his/her life. If such a discharge were not available, thousands of American citizens would have no reason to contribute to society and, therefore, become a burden to the rest of the country.

However, an individual debtor may file bankruptcy and receive a discharge of all of his/her debts once every seven years. In addition to being able to “burn” their creditors more than once, multiple filers pose even greater threats. Most first-time filers are unaware of how bankruptcy works (i.e. what can and cannot be discharged, how long the process takes, etc.). On the other hand, multiple filers know what debts can be readily discharged and are better able to “game” the system.

As a result, second (or third, or fourth . . .) time filers often prepare for bankruptcy years in advance by rebuilding their credit, obtaining credit and increasing their debts gradually, with no real intention to repay those debts. This is fraud, plain and simple. As a result, creditors should be on alert for second-time filers.

If you believe that one of your debtors has committee fraud, you should contact a bankruptcy attorney about the “nondischargeability” provisions in the bankruptcy code that may be available to you. The Bankruptcy Code sets forth an extensive list of debts that are nondischargeable. Unfortunately, nondischargeability is not automatic – a creditor that holds such a debt must file a complaint with the Bankruptcy Court seeking to have the debt declared nondischargeable. A nondischargeability complaint must usually be filed within about sixty (60) to ninety (90) days after the debtor files his or her bankruptcy petition. 

by,

Shawn P. McClure

You do.  Seems simple enough.  However, you would be surprised at the number of creditors that are under the mistaken belief that the debtor will be on the hook for any and all expenses associated with a creditor’s lawsuit to collect on a debt.

For example, your case is scheduled for trial.  The parties are not close to settlement.  The debtor has retained counsel and has fought you every step of the way.  They have offered a 50% settlement.  You are not taking a dime less than, “everything your owed and then some.”

You must appear as a witness for trial.  The debtor still will not meet your demands.  “Well, you tell that son of a b@tch that I’m flying first class; staying at the Four Seasons and charging him for my time out of the office.  It’s going to cost him a lot more if I come to court.”

It is at this point that I must kindly point out that the debtor will not be on the hook for any of the aforementioned expenses in this $3,000.00 collection action.

This is result of a general rule of law often referred to as the “American Rule.”  The American Rule provides that each party is general responsible for paying its own attorneys’ fees and expenses associated with litigation.  Like any rule, there are exceptions. The two most common exceptions to the American Rule are the existence of a statute or contract that provides for the imposition of attorneys’ fees and costs on another party.  However, as stated above, the general rule is that every party, event the winning party, must pay its own attorneys’ fees and costs.

The reasoning behind the American Rule is to prevent discouraging people from seeking redress for their perceived wrongs or from expanding legal jurisrudence.  The American Rule recognizes that any other rule would have a chilling effect on one’s decision to pursue a meritorious claim merely because they may have to pay the defendant’s expenses if unsuccessful.

In sum, just because you are suing someone don’t think that it isnt going to cost you.

by Scott Schuster, Esq.

According to a recent article in the New York Times, individual and corporate bankruptcies are at a five-year high. As a creditor, here are three things to keep in mind during these difficult financial times:

1)      With the increase in “under water” secured creditors, unsecured creditors are receiving less and less on their claims through bankruptcy. It may be a good idea to have a backup if a customer fails to pay its bills. Letters of credit, lien rights, and partial payments on delivery are all ways to mitigate the damage that can be caused by a failing customer’s bankruptcy.

2)      Just because a customer has always paid its bills in the past does not mean it will do so in the future. Increasingly, even healthy companies are struggling financially. Keep an  eye on credit terms that you extend to all of your customers, both big and small. It never hurts to reevaluate the terms on which you extend credit to your largest customers. If you conduct a credit worthiness analysis and find something troubling, it may cause you to take additional action to protect yourself from unpaid bills. If the credit check reveals no problems, at least you can sleep soundly knowing that those customers are healthy enough to pay their bills in the future.

3)      Preference actions are on the rise. Debtors and trustees are looking to preference actions as a means to fund distributions to unsecured creditors. This means creditors should be aware of the defenses to those actions and should review their “danger” clients to make sure that payment times are not getting too high. Ideally, payments should be made within (or very close to) payment terms (“NET 30,” etc.). If customers are not doing so, it may be prudent to limit the amount of credit that you extend now to protect yourself from a preference action in the future.

by Shawn P. McClure 

Under Pennsylvania common law, “the primary difference between a surety and a guarantor is the time at which a creditor can collect from each.  With regard to suretyship, the creditor can look to the surety for immediate payment upon the occurrence of a default by the principal obligor or debtor … However, where an individual is a guarantor, the creditor must first attempt to collect the debt from the principal debtor/obligor before demanding performance from the guarantor.”  Reuter v. Citizens & Northern Bank, 410 Pa.Super 199, 208, 599 A.2d 673, 678 (Pa. Super. 1991). 

Sounds troubling for a creditor.  After reading that statement, there is probably one question that quickly comes to mind.  What constitutes an “attempt?”  This question could be argued a hundred times over.  Thankfully, the Pennsylvania legislature has brought some clarity to this question. 

Under 13 Pa.C.S. § 1201, which is Pennsylvania’s codified version of the Uniform Commercial Code’s general definitional section, “[s]urety. Includes a guarantor or other secondary obligor.” 13 Pa.C.S. § 1201.  Thus, no “timing” requirement exists as to when a creditor can look to a guarantor for payment of a debt.      

Moreover, Pennsylvania statute provides that:                                                  

“[e]very written agreement hereafter made by one person to answer for the default of another shall subject such person to the liabilities of a suretyship, and shall confer upon him the rights incident thereto, unless such agreement shall contain in substance the words: “This is not intended to be a contract of suretyship,” or unless each portion of such agreement intended to modify the rights and liabilities of suretyship shall contain in substance the words: “This portion of the agreement is not intended to impose the liability of a suretyship.”

      8 P.S. § 1. See, also, Keystone Bank v. Flooring Specialists, Inc., 513 Pa. 103, 113, 518 A.2d 1179, 1184 (1986) (“section 1201 of the UCC is not the sole authority for treating a guarantor, especially where he has ‘guaranteed payment,’ as a surety.”).

      Accordingly, where Pennsylvania law applies, a creditor with adequately drafted documents does not have to first look to the principal debtor/obligor for payment before pursuing a guarantor.    

by Scott Schuster, Esq.

Since clients ask about this all the time, I thought it would be a good time to give a quick refresher on 20-day claims and briefly discuss how creditors are faring in Bankruptcy cases when it comes to 20-day claims.

Under most state laws, a credit seller has the right to “reclaim” goods (get them back or get a lien for the value), from a defaulting buyer. Most state laws require a reclamation notice be given within 20 days of the delivery. Some require as few as 10 days. Recognizing the difficulty with these short timeframes, earlier changes to the Bankruptcy Code enabled creditors to give notice within 20 days after the bankruptcy filing. The right still only covered deliveries in the 10 days before the bankruptcy.

The 2005 amendments expanded the notice rights to provide that, when goods are sold to a debtor within 45 days of a bankruptcy filing, the seller has a right to reclaim those goods, so long as the seller gives notice within the first 20 days of the bankruptcy. Failure to provide this notice results in a waiver of the reclamation right. Sellers often miss this “notice deadline” and lose their right to reclaim their goods. Further, because the rights of a reclaiming seller are subject to the rights of a prior, properly perfected lienholder on the type of goods sold, this reclamation right is often illusory. Section 503(b)(9) was inserted into the Bankruptcy Code as a way of offering relief to sellers of goods whose reclamation right is rendered meaningless – either by failing to give the required notice or because of a prior lienholder’s rights.

Creditors have had mixed results in the first three years following the addition of section 503(b)(9) to the Code. For starters, obtaining an allowed administrative claim requires an upfront investment. The creditor must do one of two things: 1) get the debtor to agree to allow the 503(b)(9) claim; or, 2) if the debtor refuses to agree, file a motion with the court. This means that the creditor often has to hire an attorney and expend resources upfront.

More importantly, debtors will often challenge the 503(b)(9) claim in an attempt to get the creditor to negotiate the amount. Debtors will often claim that they received the goods outside of the required 20-day window. This forces the creditor to show evidence, through supporting documentation and testimony. Debtors sometimes take this position solely as a negotiation tactic. Debtors know that it will cost the creditor valuable time and money to litigate the case and that the creditor may be willing to settle for less in order to avoid litigation.

Be sure to check back for A Refresher on 503 (b)(9) “20-Day Claims” Part 2

by Shawn P. McClure, Esq.

So you’ve met with an attorney and you have been informed that you have a “strong” case. Of course you instruct your attorney to immediately run to the nearest courthouse and file a writ, summons, complaint or whatever legal document is necessary in order to immediately get the ball rolling. In the words of a certain sports broadcaster on crisp fall mornings, “Not so fast my friend!”¹

Almost as important to the determination of whether or not you have a factual basis for a lawsuit, is the decision of what court to file that lawsuit in.² However, before narrowing in on a particular court, there is the question of what type of court you will file in.

Our country has a dual court system; we have both state and federal courts. Generally, the difference between the two court systems boils down to jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a court’s ability to hear a particular matter. State and local courts are, for the most part, courts of general jurisdiction with the ability to hear almost every type of dispute. Federal courts are established under the U.S. Constitution for the purpose of deciding disputes involving the Constitution and laws passed by Congress. However, there are certain scenarios where a particular matter may fall within both the jurisdiction of the state and federal court systems.

For the entire article please visit: http://www.bernsteinlaw.com/publications/021810_1.htm and tell us what you think.

By Scott E. Schuster, Esq.

I read this article in the Pittsburgh Tribune Review:(http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/s_672744.html) and it got me thinking about state oversight of financially distressed municipalities. Under Pennsylvania state law (commonly referred to as Act 47), municipalities in the Commonwealth are not eligible to file for federal bankruptcy protection without first implementing a financial recovery plan overseen by a state appointed board.

This approach to municipal reorganization stands in stark contrast to the federal bankruptcy code. Under the state law, a distressed municipality attempts to cut expenses and increase revenue in an effort to pay off its debts. The result is often a myriad of political “quick-fixes,” such as new taxes, elimination of social programs, and the sale or lease of municipal assets, such as parking garages.

The state system lacks two significant components that the bankruptcy code provides to distressed companies or municipalities to assist in reorganization. First, Act 47 does not allow for the discharge of debts. Instead, Act 47 requires that the municipality attempt to restructure certain debts or pay them off with a lump sum. Of course, financially distressed municipalities usually lack the cash flow to make lump sum payments on large debts. Similarly, Act 47 does not allow municipalities to cancel unfavorable contracts. The inability to discharge debts and cancel unprofitable contracts would have proven fatal to several big companies that have emerged from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy over the past two decades; GM, US Airways, and the Pittsburgh Penguins, just to name a few.

Second, the Bankruptcy Code gives corporate debtors the ability to “cram down” union contracts for the best interest of all creditors. In other words, the Bankruptcy Code allows union contracts to be reasonably restructured so that the company’s employees do not sap all of the company’s future revenue, leaving nothing for creditors. Act 47 system has no such provision and, in fact, relies exclusively on the political leaders of the municipality – often unions’ closest allies – to enact changes in applicable collective bargaining agreements. Such a system is destined to fail and has done so, repeatedly.

The Tribune Review reports that 25 municipalities have entered Act 47 oversight but only 6 have escaped. Proof of Act 47′s shortcomings can be seen right here in Pittsburgh, which was forced into this state form of receivership in 2004 and has spent nearly 6 years attempting to right its financial ship, but to no avail. As of this writing, Pittsburgh’s employee pensions have only 30% of the money necessary to fund future payouts. Unions have refused to agree to reduce their benefits and the politicians responsible for forcing such concessions lack the political backbone to press for change. In short, politics has taken over and, 6 years later, the City is still on the verge of bankruptcy. How has Act 47 helped the City of Pittsburgh? It hasn’t.

With the economic downturn and lack of revenue, more and more municipalities in Pennsylvania are at risk of falling into Act 47 protection. Those municipalities are staring at five to ten years of financial purgatory, during which no meaningful changes take place and bankruptcy continues to loom on the horizon. I say let Pennsylvania municipalities file bankruptcy.

by Shawn P. McClure, Esq.

In a perfect world, a creditor would never have to file a lawsuit to collect on balances due and owing from debtors.  In a great world, any judgment obtained as a result of a lawsuit would immediately be paid by the judgment debtor.  In reality, creditors are often forced to sit on a judgment and hope that their judgment debtor either comes into some money or tries to sell a piece of real estate encumbered by their judgment lien.  This can take years. 

    Does this judgment simply sit interest free?  If not, then what interest rate is applicable to the judgment?  The answer to the first question is easy.  Under Pennsylvania law, at a minimum, interest will acrue on the judgment at the rate of six percent per annum.  As a creditor you have the ability to determine whether that rate is higher or lower when contracting with your future debtor at the beginning of your relationship.  

    Pennsylvania law provides that a plaintiff is entitled to interest on a judgment for a specific sum of money from the date of the verdict.  42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8101, (“Except as otherwise provided by another statute, a judgment for a specific sum of money shall bear interest at the lawful rate from the date of the verdict or award, or from the date of the judgment, if the judgment is not entered upon a verdict or award.”).  “Thus the general rule is that a plaintiff is entitled to interest on a judgment from the date of the verdict, and for purposes of computing interest, judgment and verdict are synonymous.” Osial v. Cook, 2002 PA Super 214, 803 A.2d 209, 215 (Pa. Super. 1994).

    A plaintiff receives statutory post-judgment interest as a matter of right where the damages are ascertainable by computation. Pittsburgh Constr. Co. v. Griffith, 2003 PA Super 374 (Pa. Super. 2003).

    Currently, the statutory rate of interest in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is fixed at six percent (6%) per annum, “but parties to a contract may agree to a higher rate.” Id; See, 41 P.S. § 202; In re Estate of Braun, 437 Pa. Super. 372, 650 A.2d 73, 78 (Pa. Super. 1994) (“the courts of this Commonwealth have found that the parties may agree to a post-judgment interest rate in excess of that provided by statute”); see, e.g., Miller v. City of Reading, 369 Pa. $71, 473-474, 87 A.2d 223, 226 (1952) (party who illegally fails to pay a debt is liable to pay interest thereon at the statutory rate unless the parties expressly agree otherwise); Smith v. Mitchell, 420 Pa. Super. at 144, 616 A.2d at 21 (Pa. Super. 1992) (quoting Daset Mining Corp. v. Industrial Fuels Corp., 326 Pa. Super. 14, 36, 473 A.2d 584, 595 (1984) and recognizing that in contracts concerning the payment of the sum of money at a rate higher or lower than the legal rate, they can agree to have the agreed upon interest rate continue after the debt becomes due; in the absence of an agreement, the interest rate fixed by law attaches); Cumberland Valley Cooperative Association v. Martin, 11 D.& C. 4^th 10, 12 (C.C.P. Cumberland County 1991) (specific intent of the parties prevails over the statutory rate; parties’ agreement to pay post-judgment interest rate of 15% was upheld).

    Therefore, if the parties’ agreement is silent as to interest or refers to “legal” or “lawful” interest, the judgment creditor is limited to six percent (6%) per annum in post-judgment interest.  However, where the parties’ agreement expressly provides for a higher interest rate and the plaintiff has plead this higher rate, Pennsylvania law allows for the imposition of post-judgment interest at the higher, agreed upon rate.  Once again, another example of why it is better to plan for the worst and hope for the best when entering into a creditor/debtor relationship.